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Commentators have attributed China's piracy and counterfeiting problems to the lack of
political will on the part of Chinese authorities. They have also cited the many political,
social, economic, cultural, judicial, and technological problems that have arisen as a
result of the country's rapid economic transformation and accession to the WTO. This
provocative essay advances a third explanation. It argues that the failure to resolve
piracy and counterfeiting problems in China can be partly attributed to the lack of
political will on the part of U.S. policymakers and the American public to put intellectual
property protection at the very top of the U.S.-China agenda. The essay illustrates the
argument by examining three questions that the author has asked when he engages in
debate with U.S. scholars and policymakers over intellectual property protection in
China. The essay underscores the policy complexities involved in the U.S.-China
intellectual property debate.
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THREE QUESTIONS THAT WILL MAKE You RETHINK THE U.S. -CHINA
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEBATE
PETER K. Yu*

INTRODUCTION

The debate on China's piracy and counterfeiting problems has been ongoing for
more than two decades. However, in the past few years, this debate has taken on a
new sense of urgency and significance. In August 2008, the City of Beijing will host
the Summer Olympic Games. 1 Two years later, the 2010 World Expo will be held in
the City of Shanghai. 2 In addition, two World Trade Organization ("WTO") dispute
settlement panels were recently established to resolve disputes between China and
the United States over inadequate enforcement of intellectual property rights 3 and
inadequate market access to U.S. media products. 4 All of these developments, of
course, take place against a background of China's rise to emerging world power
5
status.
* Copyright © 2008 Peter K. Yu. Kern Family Chair in Intellectual Property Law & Director,
Intellectual Property Law Center, Drake University Law School; Wenlan Scholar Chair Professor,
Zhongnan University of Economics and Law; Visiting Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University
of Hong Kong. Ideas in this Essay have been presented at the 65th Anniversary of the Center for
Intellectual Property Law at John Marshall Law School and as part of the Law School's
Distinguished Professor Speakers Series. They have also been explored at the 14th and 15th
Fordham Annual International Intellectual Property and Policy Conferences at Fordham University
School of Law and the 2008 Scholarly Symposia Series at the University of Dayton School of Law.
The Author would like to thank Richard Gruner, Hugh Hansen, Kelly Henrici, and Doris Long, for
their kind invitations; and Jonathan Soike for excellent research and editorial assistance.
Available at www.jmripl.com.
1 For the author's earlier discussion of intellectual property protection in China in relation to
the Beijing Olympics, see Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (EpisodeI): ProtectingIntellectual
Propertyin Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901, 991-99 (2006) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates to
Partners J]. For other discussions, see Jeffrey F. Levine, A Golden Opportunity for Glohal
Acceptance? How Hosting the Olympic Games Impacts a Nation's Economy and Intellectual
PropertyRights with a Focus on the Right of Publicity, 15 SPORTS LAW. J. 245 (2008); Jennifer L.
Donatuti, Note, Can China Protect the Olympics, or Should the Olympics Be Protectedfrom China ,
15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 203 (2007); Stacey H. Wang, Note, Great Olympics, New China.*Intellectual
PropertyEnforcement Steps Up to the Mark, 27 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 291 (2005).
2 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners1, supra note 1, at 999 (discussing intellectual property
protection in China in relation to the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai).
3 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, China-MeasuresAffecting
the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/7 (Aug. 21, 2007)
[hereinafter DS 362 Panel Request].
4 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, China-MeasuresAffecting
Trading Rights and DistributionServices for Certain Publheations and Audiovisual Entertainment
Products,WT/DS363/5 (Oct. 11, 2007) [hereinafter DS 363 Panel Request].
5 For discussions of China's rise to emerging world power status, see, for example, JASPER
BECKER, DRAGON RISING: AN INSIDE LOOK AT CHINA TODAY (2006); C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL.,
CHINA: THE BALANCE SHEET: WHAT THE WORLD NEEDS TO KNOW NOW ABOUT THE EMERGING
SUPERPOWER (2006); CHINA'S CENTURY: THE AWAKENING OF THE NEXT ECONOMIC POWERHOUSE
(Laurence J. Brahm ed., 2001); JAMES KYNGE, CHINA SHAKES THE WORLD: A TITAN'S RISE AND
TROUBLED FUTURE-AND THE CHALLENGE FOR AMERICA (2006); ODED SHENKAR, THE CHINESE
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Although the Olympics, the World Expo, and the two WTO dispute settlement
panels all constitute new developments in the U.S.-China intellectual property
debate, the existing debate is not that different from the debate in the late 1990s
when I began studying intellectual property protection in China. While some
commentators have attributed China's piracy and counterfeiting problems to the lack
of political will on the part of Chinese authorities, 6 others have cited the many
political, social, economic, cultural, judicial, and technological problems that have
arisen as a result of the country's rapid economic transformation and accession to the
WTO.7
This Essay, however, advances a different explanation, which I briefly touched
upon in previous writings. It argues that the failure to resolve piracy and
counterfeiting problems in China can be partly attributed to the lack of political will
on the part of U.S. policymakers and the American public to put intellectual property
protection at the very top of the U.S.-China agenda.8 In other words, it is not only
the Chinese who lack political will, as many critics have claimed, but the Americans
as well. To illustrate this argument, this Essay examines three questions I have
asked when I engage in debate with U.S. scholars and policymakers over intellectual
property protection in China. It is the hope that the ensuing discussion will
underscore the policy complexities involved in the U.S.-China intellectual property
debate.

CENTURY: THE RISING CHINESE ECONOMY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, THE BALANCE
OF POWER, AND YOUR JOB (2005).
6 See Peter K. Yu, Still DissatisfiedAfter All These Years: Intellectual Property, Post-WTO
China, and the Avoidable Cycle of Futility,34 GA. J. INTL & COMP. L. 143, 155 (2005) (discussing
the common criticism that Chinese authorities lack political will).
7 For discussions of the ramifications for China's entry into the WTO, see generally GORDON G.
CHANG, THE COMING COLLAPSE OF CHINA (2001); NICHOLAS R. LARDY, INTEGRATING CHINA INTO
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2002); SUPACHAI PANITCHPAKDI & MARK CLIFFORD, CHINA AND THE WTO:
CHANGING CHINA, CHANGING WORLD TRADE (2002); Symposium, China and the WTO: Progress,
Perils,and Prospects, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (2003).
8 As Timothy Trainer reminded me, the failure to resolve piracy and counterfeiting problems in
China can also be attributed to the lack of corporate will. Indeed, many rights holders seem to be
playing both sides of the game. While they heavily criticize China for its lack of respect for
intellectual property rights, they remain reluctant to provide information to the U.S. government
concerning China's lack of compliance with its WTO commitments-partly out of fear that taking
political action would hurt their bottom line. See Yu, From Pirates to PartnersII supra note 1, at
929-30. Some rights holders even consider piracy losses as promotional expenses that are needed to
capture an emerging market. See id. at 982. As Microsoft's founder Bill Gates famously noted on
PBS in an exchange with Warren Buffett, chairman of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
Although about three million computers get sold every year in China, people
don't pay for the software. Someday they will, though. And as long as they're
going to steal it, we want them to steal ours. They'll get sort of addicted, and then
we'll somehow figure out how to collect sometime in the next decade.
Brent Schlender et al., The Bill & Warren Show, FORTUNE, July 20, 1998, at 48.
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I. QUESTION 1

Q: If China promised to honor one of the United States'many requests for
very dramatic improvements in a short period of time, would the United
States focus that request on nuclearnonproliferation,currency exchange, or
intellectualpropertyprotection?
A: Probablynuclearnonproliferationor currency exchange. I don't think it
would be intellectualpropertyprotection.
In a recent symposium celebrating the sixty-fifth anniversary of the Center for
Intellectual Property Law at John Marshall Law School, Ralph Oman, the former
Register of Copyrights, shared with the participants his analysis of the piracy
problem in China.9 As he recalled, before China resumed sovereignty over Hong
Kong, British diplomats who were stationed in Hong Kong used to say, "China could
take Hong Kong with a telephone call." 10 If those diplomats were right, Oman
argued, the lack of intellectual property protection could also be only a phone call
away. l a As he maintained, "The same is true about copyright piracy. China could
12
end piracy with a telephone call. All that is needed is the political willpower."
Unfortunately, those diplomats were not correct, and the piracy and
counterfeiting problems in China are much more complicated-in terms of their
relation to both domestic Chinese politics and the U.S. foreign policy.13 Even if they
were right, it is unclear whether the United States would necessarily ask for
improvements in the intellectual property area if it were allowed only one phone call.
In fact, this fictitious call would be more likely to focus on nuclear nonproliferation or
currency exchange, as the question suggests. If the call was made last year, the
discussion of tainted foods and pharmaceuticals might even precede that of
intellectual property protection.14
In the past few years since I started asking this particular question, I have yet
to meet a U.S. policymaker who picks "intellectual property protection" over the other
two choices. 15 As one former government official candidly told me, intellectual
9 Ralph Oman, CopyrightPiracyin China, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 583 (2006).
10Id. at 587.
11 See id.
12 Id.

13 For earlier discussions of the complexity of the piracy and counterfeiting problems in China,

see generally Peter K. Yu, From Piratesto Partners:ProtectingIntellectual Propertyin China in the
Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (2000); Yu, From Pirates to PartnersII supra note 1;
Peter K. Yu, IntellectualProperty,Economic Development, and the China Puzzle, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A

TRIPS PLUS ERA 173 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007) [hereinafter Yu, The China Puzzle].
14See Steven R. Weisman, Food Safety Joins Issues at US. -China Talks, N.Y. TIMES, May 23,
2007, at C3 (reporting that the safety of Chinese food exports became a new concern in U.S.-China
talks).
15The answers from policymakers contrast interestingly with that of a representative of a
leading nongovernmental organization. When asked the same question, Sophie Richardson, the
Asia Advocacy Director of the Human Rights Watch, responded, if China could successfully resolve
its piracy and counterfeiting problems, it likely would have made improvements in many other
areas.
She therefore would pick intellectual property protection over the other two choices.
Interview with Sophie Richardson, Human Rights Watch, in Charlottesville, Va. (Mar. 27, 2008).
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property protection is always "at the top of the second list." If that is the case, one
has to imagine how persuasive U.S. government officials were, are, or will be when
they negotiate with their Chinese counterparts. After all, both sides understand full
well the limitations of the intellectual property discussions and the place of those
discussions within the larger U.S.-China agenda.
The preference by U.S. policymakers for nuclear nonproliferation to stronger
intellectual property protection is easy to understand. Nuclear nonproliferation has
always been a major issue in the U.S. foreign policy, and most government officials,
including those from China and the United States, consider national security to be of
utmost importance. 16 There is also no denial that China plays a very important role
in the nuclear nonproliferation debate. China has military capabilities that allow it
to sell nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction to countries that are
hostile to the United States. 17 China is also "a permanent member of the U.N.
Security Council, with veto power over all binding U.N. actions."18 With respect to
countries that are interested in developing nuclear weapons, China was instrumental
in bringing North Korea to the Six Party talks, which have significantly relieved
international tension caused by North Korea's active nuclear weapons program.1 9
Most recently, China reportedly has also "provid[ed] the United Nations with
20
intelligence on Iran's efforts to acquire nuclear technology."
However, not all U.S. policymakers would pick nuclear nonproliferation as an
answer to this question. Many, for example, consider it equally, if not more,
important to explore trade issues within the U.S.-China agenda. Those who pick
currency exchange over nuclear nonproliferation are likely to subscribe to the belief
that economic development will hold the key to China's future political
transformation, as well as the United States' improved relationship with this
emerging power.2 1 Among the many top issues in the economic policy agenda,
policymakers often consider intellectual property protection to be of lower priority
than other general trade agenda items, such as a reduction of the U.S.-China trade
deficit or the reevaluation of renminbhi 22 As noted by Fred Bergsten and his
colleagues in the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Institute of
International Economics, "China's failure to protect intellectual property ... is
16Cf Jide Nzelibe, Are CongressionallyAuthorized Wars Perverse?,59 STAN. L. REV. 907, 931
(2007) (observing that "in polls conducted after the terrorist attacks, a super-majority of Americans
ranked terrorism and national security as the most important issues confronting the United
States").
17

See JAMES MANN, ABOUT FACE: A HISTORY OF AMERICA'S CURIOUS RELATIONSHIP WITH

CHINA, FROM NIXON TO CLINTON 228 (2000).
18BERGSTEN ET AL., supra note 5, at 140.
19 See id.at 147.

20 Damien McElroy, China Reveals Iran's NuclearSecrets to UN Inspectors, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Apr. 3, 2008, at 19.
21 See JAMES MANN, THE CHINA FANTASY: HOW OUR LEADERS EXPLAIN AWAY CHINESE

REPRESSION 1-7 (2007) [hereinafter MANN, THE CHINA FANTASY] (discussing the scenario in which
China's rapid economic growth will lead to far-reaching political change).
22 See Edmund L. Andrews, US. Warns China About Currency, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2005, at
Al (reporting that "the Bush administration warned China ...that its currency policies were
distorting world trade, and it brandished the threat of retaliation against the country's exports if
Chinese leaders did not change course in the next year"); see also BERGSTEN ET AL., supra note 5, at
92-95 (discussing how China's currency regime may pose problems for the global economy).
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probably the second most important source of friction in the bilateral U.S.-China
economic relationship." 23
The choices made by these policymakers are understandable when one takes
into account the policymaking process in the domestic arena. Even in the United
States-or, for that matter, any other developed country-the protection of
intellectual property rights is generally considered to be of lower priority than the
resolution of such domestic problems as the prevention of murders, burglaries,
robberies, thefts, arsons, assaults, and distribution of narcotics and child
pornography. 24 In a major U.S. city like New York, for example, it is not uncommon
to find street vendors selling pirated CDs and DVDs in the presence of police officers;
Canal Street, the Counterfeit Alley in the Garment District, and the Harlem district
are known sanctuaries for pirates and counterfeiters. 25 Likewise, federal prosecutors
in the United States remain reluctant to take piracy and counterfeiting cases
seriously. 26 As an industry representative told me, some district attorneys' offices in

the United States have simply refused to prosecute those cases. 27 Even if the federal
prosecutors attempt to do so, the legal and technical constraints within the
enforcement infrastructure may prevent them from taking full-scale enforcement
action. 28 There may also be serious financial concerns. In New York, for example, it
is "simply impossible to raid all the warehouses all of the time without swallowing
29
the entire NYPD anti-counterfeiting budget and taking officers off other duties."
If one travels from meat space to digital space, one will even find a large number
of American teenagers and college students whom the entertainment industries have
now labeled as "pirates," notwithstanding the fact that they look and behave quite
differently from the Asian pirates thousands of miles away. Since the emergence of
23 BERGSTEN ET AL., supra note 5, at 95 (emphasis added).
24 Compare U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROGRESS REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S TASK
FORCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 24 (2006), available at http://149.101.1.32/opa/documents/
ipreport61906.pdf (stating that 177 defendants were charged with intellectual property offenses in
2004), with Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Federal Justice Statistics,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/fed.htm (last revised Dec. 20, 2007) (stating that "criminal cases were
commenced against 92,645 defendants" in 2004).

25 See TIM PHILLIPS, KNOCKOFF: THE DEADLY TRADE IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS 31-41 (2005);

Jonathan M. Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal Street.*Reflections on Status Consumption,
IntellectualProperty, and the Incentive Thesis, 91 VA. L. REV. 1381, 1381 (2005); Sam Cocks, Note,
The Hoods Who Move the Goods: An Examination of the Booming International Trade in
CounterfeitLuxury Goods and an Assessment of the American Efforts to CurtailIts Proliferation,17
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 501, 503 (2007).
26 See Yu, From Prates to Partners1, supra note 1, at 936.
27 Other commentators have made similar observations. As Tim Phillips wrote, a U.S. attorney
reportedly told an attorney working on behalf of Herm~s, "We're a bit too busy looking after terrorist
threats at the moment." PHILLIPS, supranote 25, at 50.
28 Commenting on an earlier draft of this Essay, Rich Kuslan, the author of Asiabizblog,
pointed out that the lack of effectiveness of enforcement efforts in Manhattan may be attributable to
the high threshold required for crackdowns on counterfeit products in the borough. Enforcement
efforts in Queens, by contrast, have been much more effective, due partly to a lower threshold.
While the differences in thresholds may help explain the varying effectiveness in these two
boroughs, the irony, of course, is that the United States is currently challenging the thresholds for
criminal procedures and penalties in China before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. See DS 362
Panel Request, supra note 3, at 1. One therefore cannot help but wonder when thresholds for
enforcement are considered acceptable.
29 PHILLIPS, supra note 25, at 36.
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Napster, Aimster, KaZaA, Morpheus, and other file-sharing technologies, the
industries have greatly struggled with the massive unauthorized copying problems
within the domestic market. 30 In the past few years, the industries have filed many
rounds of lawsuits throughout the world against individuals distributing copyrighted
works illegally via peer-to-peer networks. 31 Courts in the developed world, including
Australia, Canada, and the United States, have also been inundated with cases
32
addressing secondary copyright liability.
Given the massive online "piracy" in the United States and other developed
countries, it is therefore no surprise that many Chinese find the expectations of the
U.S. government and American rights holders highly unrealistic. How can they
expect the Chinese authorities to be able to address a problem that they themselves
cannot address on their home soil?! Moreover, the current focus on the difference
between optical disc piracy (which happens mostly in China and other less developed
countries) and online piracy (which happens extensively in developed countries) may
have skewed the public perception of the piracy and counterfeiting problems in
China. As Aaron Schwabach recently pointed out, the fact that "China has a lower
percentage of people able to pirate DVDs online" may have forced piracy into the
open, thus creating the misimpression that intellectual property piracy is only or
primarily a problem in China or other less developed countries in East Asia.33 As he
explained:
People see street vendors selling DVDs, and they see images of the vendors
in the media. They don't see online downloading, which happens inside
private homes and would be fairly boring to watch. Online piracy may lead
to lawsuits, but rarely to arrests. Even when it does, the arrests are rarely
spectacular. But arrests of DVD pirates and vendors are mediagenic; they
present the spectacle of thousands of videos scattered on the ground,
crushed beneath the feet of police officers. These images-card tables
covered with obviously pirated DVDs, street vendors being led away in
handcuffs, huge piles of DVDs being destroyed-stand out in the memory.
And when the images come mostly from East Asia, the impression left in

'30
For discussions of the massive unauthorized copying problem created by peer-to-peer
technology, see generally Peter K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 907
(2004); Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 653 (2005)
[hereinafter Yu, P2Pand the Future].
31 See, e.g., Yu, P2P and the Future, supra note 30, at 658-76 (discussing the enforcement
tactics used by the U.S. recording industry in 2003).
3'2See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005)
(holding that the distributors of peer-to-peer file-sharing technologies could be liable for copyright
infringement committed by individuals using their products if they had "induced" their users to
undertake infringing activities); BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe, [2005] F.C. 193 (Can.) (addressing
the issue of whether setting up the facilities to allow copying amounts to authorizing infringement);
Universal Music Austl. Pty Ltd v. Sharman License Holdings Ltd. (2005) 65 I.P.R. 289 (Austl.)
(holding the defendant liable for authorizing users to infringe on music copyrights and directing it to
modify the software application to reduce infringement).
33 Aaron Schwabach, IntellectualPropertyPiracy:Perception and Reality in Cina,the United
States, and Elsewhere, 2 J. INT'L MEDIA & ENT. L. 65, 77-78 (2008).
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the public mind is that IP piracy is an East Asian problem, rather than a
34
North American, European, or world problem.
Finally, there has yet to be any international consensus on how the enforcement
of intellectual property rights should compare to enforcement in other areas. As
stated explicitly in article 41(5) of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs Agreement"), a WTO member state is not
required to devote more resources to intellectual property enforcement than other
areas of law enforcement. 35 It is, indeed, very hard to imagine any country-China
included-putting intellectual property protection ahead of, say, tax collection, not to
mention that the problem of tax collection remains very serious in China. 36 As I
explained in a previous article, this provision has presented a major barrier to a
WTO challenge concerning the lack of general enforcement of intellectual property
rights in China. 37
In light of this potential obstacle, the present complaint
sidestepped the provision by focusing on the lack of compliance with speeifie
provisions of the TRIPs Agreement. 38 The complaint focuses, instead, on the high
thresholds for criminal procedures and penalties in the intellectual property area, the
failure of the Chinese authorities to properly dispose of confiscated infringing goods,
and the denial of copyright protection to works that have not been authorized for
39
publication or distribution within the country.
To be certain, one could object to this question by stating that a choice among
intellectual property protection, nuclear nonproliferation, and currency exchange is a
"false conflict" that U.S. policymakers need not resolve. As a representative of the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce reminded the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission in its recent hearing, "We can walk and chew gum [at the same time] ."4O
That representative, to a large extent, was right. People walk and chew gum all the
time. Many U.S. professional athletes even chew gum when they compete in sports.

34

Id. at 78.

35 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 41(5), Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].
36 See JOHN L. CHAN, CHINA STREETSMART: WHAT YOU MUST KNOW TO BE EFFECTIVE AND

CHINA 103 (2003) (noting that "in a developing economy like China, where tax rules
are constantly changing, the loopholes are plenty and enforcement and interpretation vary from
area to area"); see also PANITCHPAKDI & CLIFFORD, supra note 7, at 162-63 (discussing how local
PROFITABLE IN

protectionism, or "warlordism," has affected the development of the auto industry); John H. Jackson,
The Impact of China's Accession on the WTO, in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM:
ENTERING THE NEW MILLENNIUM 19, 27 (Deborah Z. Cass et al. eds., 2003) ('China's
implementation of WTO obligations is partly an adjustment problem. It is also partly a problem of
the central government's power vis-A-vis local governments.").
37 See Yu, From Piratesto Partners1L supra note 1, at 935 (discussing how article 41(5) of the
TRIPs Agreement may present a major barrier to a successful WTO challenge concerning the lack of
generalenforcement of intellectual property rights in China).
38 See DS 362 Panel Request, supra note 3.
31)See id.
40 Intellectual Property Rights

Issues and Imported Counterfeit Goods: Hearing Before the
US. -ChinaEconomic and Security Review Commission, 109th Cong. 95 (2006) (remarks of Myron
Brilliant, Vice President-East Asia, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D.C.).
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However, when distracted, people have been known to choke on or swallow their gum
41
by mistake.
Today, the protection of intellectual property rights is no longer a narrow issue
that concerns only intellectual property rights holders, their investors, and their
lawyers; 42 rather, it has impacted many other areas, such as trade, agriculture,
health, the environment, education, culture, competition, free speech, democracy, and
the rule of law. 43 At the international level, the negotiations in the intellectual
property area have also spilled over into other issue areas, creating what I have
described as the "international intellectual property regime complex." 44 As I defined,
this larger conglomerate regime includes not only the traditional area of intellectual
property laws and policies, but also the overlapping areas in related regimes or fora,
such as those governing public health, human rights, biological diversity, food and
45
agriculture, and information and communications.
In light of these growing complexities, determining what to negotiate as part of
the foreign intellectual property policy is no easy task. More revealing, if intellectual
property is really like chewing gum-as compared to, say, walking-one has to
wonder how important the protection of intellectual property rights really is!

II.

QUESTION 2

Q: If the prolem for intellectual property enforcement in China were
largely attributed to the country's heavy and continuous decentralization,
would the United States be willing to help China develop a stronger central
government?
A: Definitely not.
As mentioned earlier, commentators have widely attributed the lack of
intellectual property protection and enforcement in China to the lack of political will
on the part of Chinese authorities. 46 One policy analyst, for example, wrote:
It is laughable to hear excuses from Beijing that they can't control the 50
pirate CD factories. If they were turning out thousands of copies of the
BBC documentary on the Tiananmen Square protest-rather than bootleg

41 See Boy CriticalAfter Choking on Gum, BBC NEWS, Oct. 10, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/uk news/wales/ north east/7037493.stm.
42 See Peter K. Yu, Teaching InternationalIntellectualPropertyLaw, 52 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 923,
924 (2008) (noting that intellectual property has come of age today).
43 See Peter K. Yu, InternationalEnclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual Property
Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007) [hereinafter Yu, InternationalEnclosure, Regime
Complex].
44 Symposium, The InternationalIntellectual Property Regime Complex, 2007 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1.
45 See Yu, InternationalEnclosure, Regime Complex, supra note 43, at 14.
46 See, e.g., Oman, supra note 9, at 587; James Shinn, The China Crunch, WASH. POST, Feb.
18, 1996, at C1.
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copies of "The Lion King"-the factory managers would be sharing a cell
47
with other dissidents in a heartbeat.
In recent years, this "political will" argument has been extended to cover the
2008 Beijing Olympics. As a journalist wrote a few years ago in the South China
Morning Post.
[P]rotecting intellectual property is ...a matter of national will. Nothing
offers a better example than the job Chinese officials have so far done to
protect the Olympic symbols. Since China won the right to host the 2008
Games three years ago, they have passed a series of national laws
protecting copyright of the Olympic images and more than 100 phrases like
"Green Olympics", "Hi-tech Olympics" and "People's Olympics" that the city
will use to promote the Games. They have conducted a national public
education campaign encouraging citizens to turn in offenders, and have
48
ordered commerce ministry officials to seize pirated Olympic merchandise.
Interestingly-and perhaps
disappointingly from the rights holders'
standpoint-pirated and counterfeit Olympic merchandise has already appeared in
China, especially in markets further away from Beijing. 49 The only difference
between the protection of Olympic symbols and that of foreign trademarks seems to
be the difference between the protection of movies produced by Zhang Yimou, the
famous Chinese film director, and that of movies produced by Disney, Paramount,
Warner Brothers, and other foreign movie studios. 50 Although there is stronger
protection for local works when they are first released, piracy occurs shortly
51
afterwards, and the difference in the long run is minimal.
In fact, if one could draw any lesson from the protection of Olympic symbols in
China, it is how serious and entrenched the piracy and counterfeiting problems are in
the country. This is what I have described as "the flip side of the Beijing Olympics."
Due to the country's rapid decentralization, the central government does not have the
ability to fully protect the Olympic symbols throughout the country. 52 It would,
47Shinn, supra note 46.

Faking It, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 10, 2005, at 18.
e.g., Robert Watts, Fakes Are a Real Headache, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), July 16,

48 Craig Simons,
49 See,

2006, at 8 (reporting that European customs
merchandise as early as July 2006).

officials have seized fake

Beijing Olympics

50See Joseph Kahn, The Pinch of Piraey Wakes China Up on Copyright Issue, N.Y.

TIMES,

Nov. 1, 2002, at C1 (discussing the impact of unauthorized DVDs on the action adventure movie The
Touch); Mark Magnier, A Tiger Still Crouching, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2004, at E4 (reporting about
how box office receipts of Zhang Yimou's The House of Flying Daggershad decreased dramatically
after pirated copies appeared on the street).
51See Magnier, supranote 50.
52See Tao Jingzhou, Problems and New Developments in the Enforcement of Intellectual
PropertyRightsin China, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRIPS COMPLIANCE IN CHINA: CHINESE
AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 107, 109 (Paul Torremans et al. eds., 2007) (listing local
protectionism as "the greatest barrier to intellectual property rights protection in the PRC"); Daniel
C.K. Chow, Counterfeitingin the People's Republic of China, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 26 (2000) (noting
that "local protectionism in China is widespread and poses probably the single most significant
problem in enforcement against counterfeiting"); Yiqiang Li, Evaluation of the Sino-American

IntellectualPropertyAgreements.*A JudicialApproach to Solving the Local ProtectionismProblem,
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therefore, take more than a few WTO complaints, several rounds of intellectual
property lawmaking and international treaty negotiation, many public awareness
and education campaigns, and a considerable amount of active cooperation between
the Chinese and Western stakeholders to resolve these problems.
To understand why China has great difficulty in enforcing intellectual property
rights, one has to appreciate the country's size and heterogeneity. China is large,
complex, diverse, and "sometimes internally contradictory." 53 The Chinese speak
different languages, enjoy different cuisines, grow up with different cultures, and
subscribe to different historical and philosophical traditions. 54 Conditions in Beijing
are often very different from those in Guangzhou; intellectual property strategies
that are effective in Shanghai are likely to fail in a village in western China; and the
trade patterns found in the coastal areas contrast significantly with those found in
55
the inland areas.
To make matters worse, local protectionism has been a dominant problem in
China throughout its millennial dynastic history. As Oded Shenkar noted, one of the
imprints of China's Imperial past is "the persistence of local interests that compete
for power with each other and especially with the center." 56

During the late Qing

dynasty, for example, provincial leaders were more eager to strengthen the
foundation of their personal power than to cooperate with each other to modernize
their country. 57 Despite foreign attacks, "[tiheir sense of regionalism and their
eagerness for self-preservation persisted so strongly" that the Peiyang and Nanyang
fleets refused to rescue the Fukien fleet during the Sino-French war of 1884-1885.58
For similar reasons, the Nanyang fleet and two provincial squadrons maintained
their "neutrality" during the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895, leaving the Peiyang
fleet behind to fight the Japanese navy alone. 59 A few years later, during the Boxer
Uprising in 1900, "the provincial authorities in Southeast China refused to follow the
court order of supporting the Boxers, and out of 'self-preservation' independently
entered into agreements with foreign powers." 60 When Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary
forces took Wuchang after launching the 1911 Revolution, "the provincial authorities
declared their support of the revolution and by so defying the court hastened the
61
downfall of the [Qing] dynasty."
In the republican era, regionalism gave way to warlordism, creating one of the
most chaotic periods in modern Chinese history. 62 Although the subsequent founding
of the People's Republic of China in 1949 helped centralize the country to a certain
10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 391, 395-401 (1996) (discussing the problems of local protectionism in the
context of intellectual property enforcement).
53 John J. Hamre & C. Fred. Bergsten, Prefaceto BERGSTEN ET AL., supra note 5, at ix.
54 See Yu, InternationalEnclosure, Regime Complex, supranote 43, at 23.
55 See id.; MICHAEL J. ENRIGHT ET AL., REGIONAL POWERHOUSE: THE GREATER PEARL RIVER
DELTA AND THE RISE OF CHINA 8 (2005).
5 SHENKAR, supra note 5, at 30.
57 See IMMANUEL C.Y. HSU, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 287-88 (6th ed. 2000) (discussing

how the problem of regionalism has resulted in only limited modernization in China in the late Qing
dynasty).
58 Id. at 288.

59 See id. at 340.
(o Id. at 252.
(31Jd.

(2 See id. at 482-86 (discussing the period of warlordism in Republican China).
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extent, strategic planning in the country's formative years 63 and the rapid economic
development in China within the past two decades have led to greater economic
development in certain parts of China at the expense of others.6 4 In Deng Xiaoping's
words, "some people have to get rich first." 65 As a result, there are now enormous
disparities across the country in the levels of wealth and income, the purchasing
power of local consumers, and the stages of economic and technological
66
development.
As far as intellectual property enforcement goes, the proverb "the mountains are
high, and the Emperor is far away" (shan gao huingdi yuin) remains fairly
accurate. 67 That proverb is illustrated well by the experience of a senior United
States Trade Representative ("USTR") official who visited the Guangdong province
shortly after the signing of the 1992 memorandum of understanding between China
and the United States. 68 As Joseph Massey, the former Assistant USTR for Japan
and China, recounted, that official "was [literally] told by a senior provincial
government leader that 'Beijing's agreement' with the US was 'mei you guanxi'
'
(irrelevant) in that southern province. "69
Moreover, as Andrew Mertha pointed out, the complex bureaucracies related to
intellectual property protection and enforcement have resulted in considerable
differences among protections at the national, provincial, and local levels.70 The less
developed parts of the country are also likely to present considerable structural
problems for intellectual property enforcement, including inefficient administration,
low penalties, shortage of funds, local protectionism, and severe conflicts of
interests. 7 1 Sadly, despite all of these regional differences and the country's heavily
63 See BECKER, supra note 5, at 120 (noting that, in Chairman Mao's time, "economic planners

concentrated investment in the Northeast and the interior of the country, sometimes for strategic
reasons"); ENRIGHT ET AL., supra note 55, at 5-6 (noting that during the Mao era, "[i]ndustries were
decentralized away from the coasts, creating heavy industrial centers in the western part of the
country to supplement those in the traditional heavy industrial areas in the north-east, as the
country was divided into three 'fronts', approximately corresponding to coastal, central, and western
regions").
(34For excellent discussions of the uneven regional developments in China, see generally CHINA
DECONSTRUCTS: POLITICS, TRADE AND REGIONALISM (David S.G. Goodman & Gerald Segal eds.,
1994) [hereinafter CHINA DECONSTRUCTS]; YEHUA DENNIS WEI, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA:
STATES, GLOBALIZATION, AND INEQUALITY (2007).
G'5
BERGSTEN ET AL., supra note 5, at 31.

66 See Yu, The China Puzzle, supra note 13, at 203.
(37
See ANDREW C. MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 94 (2005) (noting that decentralization has allowed local governments "to

wield more power over ... local functional units and to bend the policy stream more effectively in a
direction that is consistent with their own preferences"); Joseph A. Massey, The Emperor Is Far
Away: China's Enforeoment of InteleetualPropertyRights Protetion, 1986-2006, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L.
231, 232-33 (2006) (noting that "Chinese provincial authorities, 'far away over the mountains,'
benefit financially or politically from the proceeds of piracy or, instead, turn a blind eye to powerful
local interests that do").
68 Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Property, P.R.C.-U.S., Jan.
17, 1992, 34 I.L.M. 677.
(9Massey, supranote 67, at 235.
70 See MERTHA, supranote 67, at 90-100.

71See Keith E. Maskus et al., Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development in
China, in

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT:

LESSONS FROM

RESEARCH 295, 309 (Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005).

RECENT

ECONOMIC
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decentralized state, intellectual property developments in China are often analyzed
as if the country were homogeneous.' 2 Such an analysis, no doubt, was easier to
conduct; however, its end result also presented a misleading, if not inaccurate,
picture.
In the near future, China is likely to remain what I have described as "a country
of countries." 73 Under this scenario, stronger intellectual property protection will
appear in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and other major cities and coastal
regions.7 4 Meanwhile, the massive piracy and counterfeiting problems will stay in
China, migrating from the country's developed parts to its less developed parts.7 5 To
strike a compromise between the different regional needs, interests, and development
goals, Chinese leaders may take some rather "schizophrenic," or pragmatic, positions
in designing their intellectual property policies., 6 The resulting regional conflicts
and rivalries may also become major factors affecting the future development of
77
intellectual property protection in China.
If U.S. policymakers and rights holders are to increase protection in China, they
have two choices. First, they can undertake a more complete and deeper analysis of
the country's regional developments and develop a strategy that will better protect
intellectual assets under the divergent regional conditions. There is no guarantee
that this strategy will result in stronger overall protection in the country, but a lack
of attention to the growing regional disparities in China is very likely to result in
continued failure and frustration.
In the alternative, they can help the Chinese government become an even
stronger central government. That was the reason why I asked this particular
question in the first place. Such an effort, however, would have significant impacts
in many areas, ranging from military affairs to environmental protection and from
the protection of human rights and civil liberties to the much-needed reform of stateowned enterprises. It was, therefore, no surprise that many shook their heads when
I asked this question.

72 The

rare exception is when the USTR undertook a special provincial review of intellectual

property protection in China. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Special Provinoial
Review of Intellectual Property Rights Protection in China. Request for Public Comment, 71 Fed.
Reg. 34,969, 34,970 (June 16, 2006); see also Yu, The China Puzzle, supranote 13, at 204 (discussing
the benefits of this special provincial review).
73 Yu, From Pirates to PartnersIL, supra note 1, at 963; see also ENRIGHT ET AL., supra note
55, at 5 ("[M]ost opportunities and challenges in China today are driven as much by regional issues
and regional concerns as they are by national issues and national concerns. Many of the best
opportunities and toughest challenges for China are regional in nature.").
74 See Yu, InternationalEnclosure, Regime Complex, supranote 43, at 25.
75 See id.
76 See id.
77 Cf ENRIGHT ET AL., supra note 55, at 5 ("Competition between regions and between
individual jurisdictions have been played out in the corridors of power in Beijing, as well as in the
regions themselves."); David S.G. Goodman, The Politics of Regionalism: Economic Development,
Conflict and Negotiation, in CHINA DECONSTRUCTS, supra note 64, at 1, 7 (noting that "[c]ompetition
between provinces can be fierce, and there are numerous tales of 'commodity wars' between
provinces over, amongst other items, rice, wool, soy, beans, tobacco, coal, and steel"); Yu, The China
Puzzle, supra note 13, at 207 (noting that '[a]s regional and local governments fight hard to attract
FDI, the picture we will see in China is likely to be more complicated in the near future than it is
today").
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In fact, contrary to common beliefs,7 8 stronger intellectual property protection
may not always benefit the United States. First, stronger intellectual property
protection may eventually take away the United States' competitive advantage. As
China offers stronger intellectual property protection, more American and
multinational firms will relocate to China to take advantage of its lower production
costs and considerable market potential. 79 More technology will be transferred as a
80
result, and more domestic jobs will be "outsourced."
More importantly, as James Mann wrote in his recent book, there is a tendency
to assume that stronger economic development will result in the political
transformation of China.81 However, as he observed, few have looked at the scenario
in which "China manages to continue on its current economic path, yet its political
system does not change in any fundamental way."82 Indeed, greater economic
development may lead to an even stronger central government in China.8 3 Thus, by
promoting economic development, the push for stronger intellectual property rights
may lead to a stronger central government in China that many Americans have
found undesirable.

III. QUESTION 3
Q: Would the United States be interestedin promoting the distribution and
reproductionof censoredinformationin China?
A: You bet.
Commentators have widely discussed the tension between intellectual property
protection and the protection of free speech. 84 In a recent book, Nell Netanel
described this copyright-free speech conflict as the "copyright's paradox." 85 Although
the United States Supreme Court described copyright as the "engine of free
expression" 86 and pointed out that the U.S. copyright scheme "incorporates its own
speech-protective purposes and safeguards,"8 7 there is significant tension between

78 See, e.g., Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Does Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, 32
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 203, 204 (2006) (noting that '[a] nationwide crackdown on counterfeiting
will ... result in significant economic and social costs that may pose a threat to the central
government in Beijing").
79See Peter K. Yu, Trade Barriers Won't Contain China's Cars, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 25, 2007,
at 15A.
80 See id.

81 See MANN, THE CHINA FANTASY, supra note 21, at 1-7.

82 Id. at 10-12.
83 See id. at 10.
84 For a recent treatment of the tension between intellectual property protection and the
protection of free speech, see generally NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX (2008).
See other sources cited in Yu, The EscalatingCopyright Wars, supra note 30, at 927 n. 145.
85 NETANEL, supra note 84; see also Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyri/ht Abridge the First
Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press , 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1181 (1970) (describing
the conflict as "a largely ignored paradox").
86 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
87 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
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the protection of copyright and that of free speech in many less developed countries.88
The tension is particularly acute in countries where information flows are heavily
regulated.8 9 In countries with strict information control, the lack of protection of
intellectual property rights may eventually help promote the wide distribution of
90
censored materials.
To be certain, unauthorized reproduction and distribution will result in wider
dissemination of not only the censored materials, but also entertainment products in
general.
The dissemination-or, worse, the exportation-of the latter would
therefore hurt the rights holders, taking away the potential incentives for future
creations. Nonetheless, it is important not to overlook the important spillover effects
in promoting democratic transition that may be created by the wide distribution of
American entertainment products. Even though many of these products may seem
uncontroversial, they do have the ability to feature the American way of life and
therefore suggest the possibility for a different, if not better, life. 91 It is, indeed, not
uncommon to find Hollywood movies or American television programs filled with
discussions of the American government, the need for checks and balances or the
92
separation of powers, and the protection of constitutional rights and civil liberties.
Even the latest installments of Star Wars are filled with issues concerning
corruption, slavery, federalism, democracy, racial tension, and the American
93
government.

88 See Michael D. Birnhack, Global Copyright, Local Speech, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
491, 544-46 (2006).
89 See id.
90See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright's Democratic Principles in the Global
Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217, 253-57 (1998) [hereinafter Netanel, Asserting Copyright's Democratic
Prineples] (noting that the wide dissemination of alternative sources of information and opinion
may help induce transitions from authoritarian to democratic government).
91See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283,
350 (1996). As Neil Netanel explained:
Many creative works have broad political and social implications even if they do
not appear or even seek to convey an explicit ideological message. Literature and
art may be subtle, but powerful, vehicles for attitude change or reinforcement.
Even what may seem to be abstract, "pure" artistic expression may challenge
accepted modes of thought and belie the efforts of governments or cultural
majorities to standardize individual sensitivities and perceptions. For that reason
totalitarian regimes have prohibited styles of art and music that might be seen as
politically innocuous in other contexts-and for that reason a democratic polity
committed to the dialogic interchange of independent-minded individuals must
protect them from official or private censorship.
Id.; see also Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73, 96-101 (1996) (providing examples
to illustrate the destabilizing potential of art and the relationship between art censorship and
totalitarian regimes); Netanel, Asserting Copyright's Democratic Principles,supra note 90, at 25357 (discussing how the commercial media help "undermine authoritarian rule by providing a
window to the democratic West and presenting a rosy portrait of life in a more open and materially
prosperous society").
92 See e.g., ABSOLUTE POWER (Columbia Pictures 1997); THE PEOPLE VS. LARRY FLYNT
(Columbia Pictures 1996); Law & Order(NBC television broadcast 1990-Present); The West Wing
(NBC television broadcast 1999-2006).
93 STAR WARS: EPISODE I-THE PHANTOM MENACE (Twentieth Century Fox 1999); STAR
WARS: EPISODE II-ATTACK OF THE CLONES (Twentieth Century Fox 2002); STAR WARS: EPISODE
III-REVENGE OF THE SITH (Twentieth Century Fox 2005).
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When Internet distribution is involved, the tension between copyright protection
and free dissemination of ideas becomes even greater. 94 Thanks to the high speeds
and low costs of reproduction and distribution, the anonymous architecture, and the
many-to-many communication capabilities, the Internet has become a particularly
effective means of communication. 95 For example, "[tihe growth of the Internet, in
tandem with other technologies such as short messaging services, has ... engendered
a phenomenon of increasingly relevant 'public opinion' in China, where incidents not
necessarily prioritized by traditional media receive national attention and frequently
lead to calls for government action and response." 96 In addition, the Internet
provides individual users with information about how people live in other countries
while enabling them to make informed judgment about the possibilities for life. 97 At
times, the Internet may even paint a vivid, and sometimes brutal, picture of the
enormous disparities between the developed and less developed worlds. 98 It is,
therefore, no surprise that many countries see the Internet as a political threat. 99
While the Taliban regime in Afghanistan banned the use of the Internet, 100 North
Korea "allows only a small community of elites and foreigners online." 10 1
In China, despite its accession to the WTO in 2001, information remains heavily
censored, and media distribution channels are tightly controlled. 10 2 As Jonathan
Zittrain and John Palfrey wrote recently, in the digital environment, "China
institutes by far the most extensive filtering regime in the world, with blocking
10 3
occurring at multiple levels of the network and spanning a wide range of topics."
94 See A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of-RegulatoryArbitrage, in BORDERS IN
CYBERSPACE: INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 129, 129
(Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997) (contending that "the more a nation pursues a restrictive
Internet policy, the less value it will derive from the network and the more it risks being left out of
the information revolution"); Peter K. Yu, Bridging the DigitalDivide: Equality in the Information
Age, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 2 (2002) [hereinafter Yu, Bridging the DigitalDivide] (noting
that the information revolution has created a tremendous amount of political, social, economic,
educational, and career opportunities).
95See Froomkin, supranote 94 (discussing the difficulties of censorship on the Internet).
96 China (IncludingHong Kong), in ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL
INTERNET FILTERING 263, 265 (Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter ACCESS DENIED]; see

also Benjamin L. Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese Legal System, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 82-91 (2005) (discussing the Sun Zhigang case in the context of popular opinion
and the Internet in China).
97See Yu, Bridging the DigitalDivide, supra note 94, at 23.
98 See id. at 27.
99For discussions of global online censorship, see generally ACCESS DENIED, supra note 96;
SHANTHI KALATHIL & TAYLOR C. BOAS, OPEN NETWORKS, CLOSED REGIMES: THE IMPACT OF THE
INTERNET ON AUTHORITARIAN RULE (2003).
100See Yu, Bridging the DigitalDivide, supranote 94, at 37.
101Stephanie Wang, InternetFilteringin Asia, in ACCESS DENIED, supra note 96, at 155, 156.
102 See Henry S. Gao, The Mighty Pen, The Almighty Dollar,and the Holy Hammerand Sickle:
An Examination of the Confliet Between Trade Liberalization and Domestic CulturalPolicy with
Special Regard to the Recent Dispute Between the US. and China on Restrictions on Certain
CulturalProducts,2 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 313, 319 (2007). See generallyPeter
K. Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives: Using Shakespeare to Reconfigure the US. -China
Intellectual PropertyDebate, 19 B.U. INT'L. L.J. 1, 28-32 (2001) [hereinafter Yu, Piracy,Prejudice,
and Perspectives] (discussing the impact of China's censorship and information control policy on the
country's intellectual property protection).
103 Jonathan Zittrain & John Palfrey, Introduction to ACCESS DENIED, supra note 96, at 1, 3.
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Indeed, the lack of market access to Western media products was among the issues
raised by the two recent complaints the United States filed against China before the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body.10 4 In the first complaint, the United States claimed
that article 4 of the Chinese copyright law was inconsistent with the TRIPs
Agreement.10 5 As the United States contends, materials that are subject to
prepublication and predistribution reviews will lose copyright protection,10 6 even
though the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and
the TRIPs Agreement prohibit the use of formalities to prevent the enjoyment and
exercise of copyrights.10 7 In the second complaint, the United States further claimed
that China failed to honor the commitments it made in the Accession Protocol that
the country will "fully open the right to trade, with some limited exceptions ....
10 8
within three years after accession."
The United States' complaints are understandable, and the fact that the two
complaints were filed on the same day provides a strategic reminder of the
interrelationship between intellectual property protection and market access.10 9 A
strong information control policy will result in the reduced competitiveness of U.S.
media products. Because of censorship and distribution restrictions, many foreign
media products, movies in particular, fail to obtain approval despite their success in

104 See e.g., Request for Consultations by the United States, China-MeasuresAffecting the
Protection and Enforvement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/1 (Apr. 16, 2007)
[hereinafter DS 362 Complaint]; Request for Consultations by the United States, China-Measures
Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual
EntertainmentProducts,WT/DS363/1 (Apr. 16, 2007) [hereinafter DS 363 Complaint].
105 See DS 362 Panel Request, supra note 3, at 3-6; see also Copyright Law of the People's
Republic of China art. 4 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Sept. 7, 1990,
amended Oct. 27, 2001, effective Nov. 1, 2001) (P.R.C.), http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo-English/laws/
relatedlaws/200204It20020416 34754.htm ("Works the publication or distribution of which is
prohibited by law shall not be protected by this Law.").
106 See DS 362 Panel Request, supra note 3, at 5-6 (stating that "it appears that the measures
at issue establish different pre-distribution and pre-authorization review processes for Chinese
nationals' works, performances (or their fixations) and sound recordings than for foreign nationals'
works, performances (or their fixations) and sound recordings").
107 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 5(2), Sept. 9,
1886, revised at Paris July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (stipulating that "t]he
enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any formality"); TRIPs Agreement,
supra note 35, art. 9(1) (stating that WTO member states "shall comply with Articles 1 through 21 of
the Berne Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto"). Butcf Berne Convention, supra, art. 17:
The provisions of this Convention cannot in any way affect the right of the
Government of each country of the Union to permit, to control, or to prohibit, by
legislation or regulation, the circulation, presentation, or exhibition of any work or
production in regard to which the competent authority may find it necessary to
exercise that right.
Id.
108 DS 363 Panel Request, supra note 4, at 2; see also Gao, supra note 102 (providing an
excellent discussion of the market access dispute).
10) See DS 362 Complaint, supra note 104; DS 363 Complaint, supra note 104. Both
complaints were filed on April 10, 2007. See DS 362 Complaint, supranote 104; DS 363 Complaint,
supra note 104. However, the establishment of WTO dispute settlement panels was requested at
different times: August 21, 2007, for the intellectual property enforcement dispute and October 11,
2007, for the market access dispute. See DS 362 Panel Request, supra note 3; DS 363 Panel
Request, supra note 4.

[7:412 2008]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

other markets. 110 As a result, their rights holders are unable to distribute the
products in China, and consumers have to resort to other channels of dissemination,
settling for black market products or pirated goods. Although these substitutes are
often inferior to the genuine products, many consumers do not have counterparts to
compare with or select from. As time passes, the Chinese market becomes saturated
with unauthorized substitutes. Even if market barriers are finally removed, foreign
copyright holders may have a very tough time entering the market.1 11
Although the ideal solution to this market access problem is to increase market
access and strengthen copyright protection at the same time, 11 2 one has to wonder
whether it would always be beneficial to push for stronger protection of intellectual
property rights if market access, unfortunately, remains limited in China. After all,
just like in Russia and other former Soviet republics, the lack of intellectual property
protection in China-or what some commentators have described as "benign
neglect" 13 -may result in greater distribution of Western media products, which in
turn may result in further political developments and perhaps even stronger
intellectual property protection in the near future.1 1 4 As Nell Netanel maintained:
[imposing copyright protection for foreign works in the authoritarian state
could drastically diminish the supply of such works in that country. Such
protection may well put many foreign works beyond the price range of that
country's consumer public. It would also give dictatorial authorities an
internationally acceptable justification for suppressing the works'
dissemination.... Since the vast majority of those works would continue to
be created even without copyright protection in the authoritarian state, the
result, at least in static terms, would be a significant welfare loss. As far as
the availability of foreign democracy-inducing expression is concerned, the
imposition of copyright protection for that expression in authoritarian
states would seem to have a detrimental, not positive, effect on democratic
1 15
transition.
The Chinese leaders face a similar, yet different, dilemma. From the standpoint
of economic development, stronger copyright protection is likely to result in reduced
110 For discussions of the quota on the importation of foreign movies to China, see generally
Mary Lynne Calkins, Censorship in Chinese Cinema, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 239, 291-96
(1999); Carl Erik Heiberg, Note, American Films in China.*An Analysis of China's Intellectual
Property Record and Reconsideration of Cultural Trade Exceptions Amidst Rampant Piracy, 15
MINN. J. INTL L. 219, 234-38 (2006).
111 See Yu, Piracy,Prejudice, andPerspectives,supra note 102, at 32.
112 See Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society supra note 91, at 285 (noting that
"[ilf copyright is cast too narrowly, authors may have inadequate incentives to produce and
disseminate creative works or may be unduly dependent on the support of state or elite patrons").
113 See,
e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, Toward a New Era of Objective Assessment in the Field of
TRIPS and Variable Geometry for the Preservation of Multilateralism,8 J. INTL ECON. L. 77, 100

(2005).

114 See generally RUSSIAN MEDIA LAW AND POLICY IN THE YELTSIN DECADE: ESSAYS AND

DOCUMENTS (Monroe E. Price, Andrei Richter & Peter K. Yu eds., 2002) (discussing the background
on the changing Russian media landscape as a result of the disintegration of the former Soviet
Union).
H5 Netanel, Asserting Copyright'sDemocraticPrinciples,supra note 90, at 255-57.
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access to information and knowledge and the limited availability of foreign computer
technologies. Except for selected industries, which will obtain direct benefits from
stronger protection, the lack of protection may result in greater benefits to other
economic sectors and a larger part of the country. 116 Thus, until China reaches a
crossover point where stronger protection is in its self-interests, the country may
117
remain reluctant to offer stronger intellectual property protection.
From the standpoint of information control, however, stronger copyright
protection may help control the flow of information. From restrictions on the
distribution of copyrighted materials developed by Chinese authorities to the ban on
domestic distribution of sensitive materials that have been developed and
copyrighted by foreign authors, copyright protection is likely to help legitimize
China's information control policy. For example, by relying on the TRIPS Agreement
or U.S. intellectual property laws as the model for information control, such
protection would promote censorship of politically-sensitive information while at the
same time preventing human rights and civil liberties groups from criticizing the
Chinese authorities for their actions. As William Alford noted a decade ago:
[lit is no wonder that stories are now circulating among well-informed
observers in China that some of the more staunchly authoritarian of the
PRC's leaders were only too happy to satisfy Washington's latest demands
to crack down on printing houses and producers of films and CDs, as it
provided a convenient legitimization for repressive measures they intended
to take in any event while simultaneously constraining America's capacity
118
to complain about such actions.
It is important to remember that copyright was introduced as a response to the
printing press-a modern reprographic technology. 119 In a little more than two
centuries following the invention of the Gutenberg press, both the Church and the
Crown used printers' privileges to suppress heretical thoughts. 120 Although the
origin of the modern notion of copyright is often linked to the English statute of
Anne, 121 historians have traced the notion back to the Star Chamber and the

116 See Maskus et al., supra note 71, at 302-06 (noting that stronger intellectual property
protection would incur significant costs, such as administrative and enforcement costs, adjustment
costs due to labor displacement, social costs associated with monopoly pricing, higher imitation and
innovation costs and potential costs resulting from the abuse of intellectual property rights); Yu, The
China Puzzle, supra note 13, at 183-84 (discussing the costs of strengthening intellectual property
protection).
117 See Yu, The China Puzzle, supra note 13, at 202 (discussing the proverbial crossover point
at which China will consider stronger intellectual property protection in its self-interests).
118 William P. Alford, Making the World Safe for What? Intellectual PropertyRights, Human
Rights and ForeignEconomic Policy in the Post-European Cold War World 29 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. &

Pol. 135, 144-45 (1997).
119 See Peter K. Yu, Of Monks, Medieval Scribes, and Middlemen, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1,
15-20 (2006).
120 See id. at 17.
121 An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the
Authors or Purchasers of Such Copies, During the Times Therein Mentioned, 8 Anne, c. 19 (1709)
(Eng.).

[7:412 2008]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

Stationers' Company in England. 122 Given the interrelationship between copyright
and censorship in the early days of copyright development, it is more than
coincidence that the parent body of the National Copyright Administration in China
is the Press and Publications Administration, the agency in charge of propaganda
and information control. 123 Interestingly, despite this bureaucratic structure, the
Chinese authorities have yet to succeed in using copyright effectively to censor
politically-sensitive expressions. Thus, if these authorities are as eager to control
information as commentators have alleged, one cannot help but notice how extensive
and entrenched the Chinese piracy problem is. Indeed, it would be very difficult, if
not impossible, for the central government to eradicate the problem in a short period
of time. The government needs more than just political willpower!
The conundrum concerning the tension between intellectual property protection
and the protection of free speech equally affects U.S. policymakers, though for
different reasons. Consider, for example, the tension, or potential conflict, between
the proposed Global Online Freedom Act ("GOFA")124 and the enacted Digital
Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").125 As GOFA declared:
It shall be the policy of the United States(1) to promote the ability of all to access and contribute information, ideas,
and knowledge via the Internet and to advance the right to receive and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers
as a fundamental component of United States foreign policy;
(2) to use all instruments of United States influence, including diplomacy,
trade policy, and export controls, to support, promote, and strengthen
principles, practices, and values that promote the free flow of information;
and
(3) to prohibit any United States businesses from cooperating with officials
of Internet-restricting countries in effecting the political censorship of
online content. 126

The proposed statute "would establish 'minimum corporate standards for online
freedom' and would impose export controls on the sales of any item 'to an end user in
an Internet-restricting
country for the purpose .. .of facilitating Internet

122 For comprehensive discussions of the Star Chamber and the Stationers' Company, see
generally AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, SEVEN LECTURES ON THE LAW AND HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN
BOOKS (1899); CYPRIAN BLAGDEN, THE STATIONERS' COMPANY: A HISTORY, 1403-1959 (1960);
LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 28-77 (1968).
123 Soo MERTHA, supra note 67, at 140.
124 Global Online Freedom Act of 2006, H.R. 4780, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter GOFA].
125 Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
126 GOFA, supra note 124, § 101.
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censorship." 127 Meanwhile, the DMCA prohibits the circumvention of copy-protection
technologies that have been used to protect copyrighted content. 128 The recent
2
Supreme Court decision of Metro-Goldwyn -Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.1 9
also encouraged the development of filtering technologies as part of the strategy to
reduce secondary copyright liability. 130 Interestingly, and perhaps coincidentally,
China "blocks access not only to known circumvention sites, but sites that are known
' 131
to provide information and tutorials about censorship circumvention."
Worse still, the United States has sometimes "exported" these conflicting policy
goals, and therefore the conundrum, to other countries through its aggressive push
for copyright reforms in the American image. As I noted in a recent article, 132 the
Hong Kong government is currently confronted with a catch-22 situation in which it
has to decide whether to "provide a specific mechanism under the law for copyright
owners to compel [Internet service providers] to disclose their clients' information
and to impose a requirement under the Copyright Ordinance for [these providers] to
keep logs."

133

If the government does not offer stronger copyright protection, it is

likely to be criticized by the Western press for inadequate response to the massive
file-sharing activities conducted online by local Internet users. 13 4 Unsurprisingly,
such criticisms would resonate well with those who are concerned about the lack of
respect for the rule of law and intellectual property rights in China. However, if the
government increases copyright protection, the Western press is likely to criticize
Hong Kong for its lack of protection of privacy, free speech, and other individual
liberties. 13 5 Such criticisms were particularly troublesome in light of the heightened
media scrutiny following the tenth anniversary of China's resumption of sovereignty
over Hong Kong. Regardless of the action it takes, the Hong Kong government is
likely to become a target of criticism by the Western press-ironically, for its efforts
to respond to Western concerns.

127

Jonathan Zittrain & John Palfrey, Reluctant Gatekeepers: CorporateEthics on a Filtered

Internet, in ACCESS DENIED, supra note 96, at 103, 118 (quoting GOFA, supra note 124, tit. 2 &
§ 301).
128 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
See generally Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Antiantioiroumvention, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 13, 24-25 (2006) (discussing the anticircumvention
provision of the DMCA).
129 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
130 See id. at 939 (stating that "th[e] evidence of unlawful objective is given added significance
by MGM's showing that neither company attempted to develop filtering tools or other mechanisms
to diminish the infringing activity using their software"). But see id. at 939 n.12 (noting,
nevertheless, that "in the absence of other evidence of intent, a court would be unable to find
contributory infringement liability merely based on a failure to take affirmative steps to prevent
infringement, if the device otherwise was capable of substantial noninfringing uses").
131 Ronald Deibert & Rafal Rohozinski, Good for Liberty,Bad for Security? Global Civil Society
and the Securitizationof the Internet,in ACCESS DENIED, supra note 96, at 123, 134.
132 See Yu, InternationalEnclosure, Regime Complex, supra note 43, at 30-31.
133 COMMERCE, INDUS. & TECH. BUREAU, HKSAR GOVT, COPYRIGHT PROTECTION IN THE
DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT (2006), available at http://www.cedb.gov.hk/ci-tb/ehtml/pdf/consultation/
Consultationdocument.pdf. For the author's response to the Hong Kong government's consultation

paper, see PETER K. Yu, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT REFORM IN HONG KONG: PROMOTING CREATIVITY
WITHOUT SACRIFICING FREE SPEECH (2007), available at http://jmsc.hku.hk/cms/images/stories/
jmscdigitalcopyright.pdf.
134

See Yu, InternationalEnclosure,Regime Complex, supra note 43, at 31.
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See id.
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In sum, copyright and free speech may pose significant conflict in countries
where safeguards, balancing tools, and correction mechanisms are not present or well
developed. While stronger copyright protection may better protect the economic, and
at times moral, interests of copyright holders, it does raise serious concerns among
human rights and civil liberties groups. By significantly reducing the reproduction
and distribution of Western ideas, copyright protection may stifle political
developments in other countries. The promotion of stronger copyright protection
therefore may jeopardize the United States' longstanding policy in promoting human
rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law. At some point, the benefits of greater
dissemination of copyrighted information may outweigh the copyright system's "free
13 6
speech burdens."

CONCLUSION

When piracy and counterfeiting problems in China are discussed, there is a
tendency to simplify the issues to black and white. As James Boyle noted more than
a decade ago, the issues are often presented as a morality play:
For a long time, the evil pirates of the East and South have been
freeloading on the original genius of Western inventors and authors.
Finally, tired of seeing pirated copies of PresumedInnocent or Lotus 1-2-3,
and infuriated by the appropriation of Mickey Mouse to sell shoddy Chinese
toys, the Western countries-led by the United States-have decided to
take a stand. What's more ....the United States is standing up for more
than just filthy lucre. It is standing up for the rights of creators, a cause
that has attracted passionate advocates as diverse as Charles Dickens and
13 7
Steven Spielberg, Edison and Jefferson, Balzac and Victor Hugo.
Unfortunately, despite a decade of developments, progresses, and reforms in the
intellectual property field in China, the debate we have today remains as
unsophisticated, unnuanced, and oversimplified as it was a decade ago. Oftentimes,
the outcome of this debate depends on whether China is considered a friend or a foe;
whether those engaged in the debate are China optimists or China pessimists; and
whether the debaters place high values on exclusive rights or public access.
The three questions examined in this Essay demonstrate why the piracy and
counterfeiting problems in China are much more complex than what has hitherto
been presented in the U.S.-China intellectual property debate.
Until U.S.
policymakers and the American public can make up their minds over how to resolve
these complexities, it is unrealistic to expect the American intellectual property
policy toward China to result in dramatic improvements in intellectual property
protection in the country-no matter how many Olympic Games or World Expos
China will host and how many WTO complaints the United States will file.
136 See generally NETANEL, supra note 84, at 109-53 (discussing the "free speech burdens" of
the copyright system).
137 JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE & SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY 123 (1996).

